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On 19 September 2016, the European Council recommended the establishment of National 
Productivity Boards (NPBs) by the Member States to help identify structural problems of 
low growth in productivity and macroeconomic imbalances in euro area countries. This 
article reviews certain basic aspects of the design and main features of these new 
institutions. Adequate NPB design, appropriate and clear definition of NPB functions and 
guaranteed access to the resources necessary to perform such functions could contribute 
to enriching the analysis and debate, at national and European level, of the structural 
reforms needed to improve productivity and competitiveness. Insofar as the mandate of 
these institutions also encompasses the assessment of alternative economic policies, their 
recommendations could become a catalyst for boosting a reform agenda. 
Following the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it was expected that 
internal differences within the euro area would be absorbed mainly through the effect that 
the misalignment of competitiveness exerts on internal demand and cost and price 
formation. To aid the proper functioning of this channel, a framework of economic policy 
coordination was established with the aim, inter alia, that the Member States should 
pursue the necessary reforms to avoid the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances. 
However, after the introduction of the single currency, the differences between national 
current account balances and competitiveness indicators in EMU Member States widened 
(see Chart 1), rather than narrowing, although the onset of the financial crisis contributed 
subsequently to their reduction. In parallel, the European coordination framework did not 
promote the implementation of the economic policies needed to face the main challenges 
shared by EMU Member States and essentially affecting their long-term growth (see Chart 
2), most notably population ageing and low productivity growth.1 These challenges 
demand national solutions which sometimes also require coordinated economic policy 
positions within the Monetary Union. 
Against this background, the European Council approved the creation of a new framework 
to monitor macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness.2 This new framework aims 
to provide the euro area with an appropriate mechanism to detect in time the emergence 
of macroeconomic imbalances, with special emphasis on the risks associated with the 
accumulation of such imbalances and the loss of competitiveness within the euro area and 
its possible contagion to other Member States. This framework should also make it less 
possible for such imbalances to arise or, if they do arise, it should help to correct them 
through the implementation of appropriate economic policies.
Thus, the identification of national regulations that may generate competitive differences 
among the Member States has gained relevance in Europe’s political agenda. Notably, 
these include factors linked to the functioning of the labour market, the financial market, 
Introduction
1  L. Summers (2014), “U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower Bound”, 
Business Economics, vol. 49 (2); CEPR (2014), “Secular stagnation: facts, causes and cures”; Banco de España 
(2015), “Growth and Reallocation of Resources in the Spanish Economy”, Annual Report, Chapter 3.
2  See M. L. Matea (2012), “Nuevo marco de vigilancia de los desequilibrios macroeconómicos de la UE”, Boletín 
Económico, March, Banco de España.
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regulations impacting effective competition among firms and, in general, those relating to 
productivity growth. It is against this background that the European Council issued on 19 
September 2016 a recommendation for the establishment of so-called National Productivity 
Boards (NPBs) by each of the Member States,3 mainly to monitor competitiveness and 
related policies.  
This article reviews the reasoning behind the establishment of NPBs and describes their 
mandate and functions, as envisaged by the aforementioned recommendation. The main 
features of the institutions already existing in certain EU countries which carry out 
competitiveness monitoring and diagnostic tasks are described under point 3 below.
As noted in the introduction, the generation of macroeconomic imbalances and the 
prospects of lower productivity growth drove the EU authorities to initiate the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure (MIP) in 2011.4 The monitoring of these imbalances is part of the 
European Semester for the coordination of economic policies between the European 
Commission (EC) and member countries. The purpose is to identify, on an annual basis, by 
The design of National 
Productivity Boards in the 
European context
SOURCES: IMF, INE and Banco de España.
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
 SPAIN  PORTUGAL  IRELAND
 GREECE  ITALY  FRANCE
 GERMANY
2  LABOUR COST-BASED COMPETITIVENESS INDICES
100 = 1999
STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CERTAIN EMU COUNTRIES
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
Spain Portugal Ireland Greece Italy Germany France
 2015  2007
1 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
% of GDP
CHART 1
SOURCE: European Commission.
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
TFP CAPITAL WORK (HOURS) POTENTIAL GDP
CONTRIBUTION TO POTENTIAL GDP GROWTH IN THE EURO AREA CHART 2
3  The recommendation approved by the European Council was directed at euro area Member States, although 
other EU Member States are also encouraged to set up similar institutions. 
4  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/index_
en.htm.
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means of indicators and in-depth reviews in each country, the degree of macroeconomic 
imbalances in each European economy and in the euro area in general and their drivers, 
with the aim of proposing a series of economic policy recommendations to be approved by 
the European Council. As occurs with the Excessive Deficit Procedure in connection with 
budgetary policy, the MIP is endowed with a series of monitoring mechanisms and sanctions 
in the event that the recommendations are not implemented by the countries involved. 
Since its inception, the MIP has encountered difficulties in promoting the implementation 
of a substantial number of European Council recommendations on structural reforms (see 
Chart 3). Indeed, despite the fact that the vulnerabilities of economies have lessened since 
the entry into force of the MIP, there are still high macroeconomic risks requiring policy 
actions in most countries (see Table 1). In this connection, it should be recognised that 
there are certain constraints, both external and internal to governments in each country, to 
promoting far-reaching reform plans. For example, the fact that it usually takes a long time 
for the positive effects of structural policies to materialise, that these effects are not always 
uniform within population groups or that they require the coordination of different tiers of 
government may discourage their implementation.5
Precisely for the purpose of fostering national responsibility for identifying any necessary 
reforms and facilitating their implementation, the Five Presidents’ Report6 of 12 February 
2015 called for the creation of a system of national competitiveness authorities. Specifically, 
the report recommended the creation of NPBs in each of the euro area Member States in 
the form of national bodies responsible for monitoring competitiveness and related 
policies. Also, in order to ensure some supra-national coordination, the report proposed 
maintaining the European Semester’s system of recommendations, although it suggested 
that the NPBs’ analyses should be taken into account by the EC when drawing up its 
recommendations.
In this setting, the EC initiated in 2016 the work required to prepare the recommendation 
on the establishment of NPBs approved by the ECOFIN on 17 June 2016,7 which was 
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5  Tompson, William (2009), The Political Economy of Reform: Lessons from Pensions, Product Market and Labour 
Markets in ten OECD Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris.
6  https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_es.pdf.
7  http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10083-2016-INIT/en/pdf.
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finally adopted by the European Council on 19 September 2016.8 The recommendation 
specified the objectives and functions of such boards, their organisational and functional 
characteristics and their relationships with the EC, particularly within the European 
Semester framework. Also, the countries are required to implement the recommendation 
within 18 months from its approval on 19 September 2016.
As regards their functions, the recommendation establishes that the Member States shall 
set up independent bodies (NPBs) that assess and analyse developments in productivity 
and competitiveness and their drivers, taking into account euro area and EU factors, as 
well as policies implemented in this field. These boards should review long-term drivers of 
2015
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productivity. The recommendation underscores the role of innovation and the capacity to 
attract investment, physical and human capital, and other factors that can affect prices 
and the quality of goods and services relative to those of our competitors.
The recommendation indicates that the analysis of competitiveness should be underpinned 
by transparent indicators and, as far as possible, susceptible to a certain homogeneity 
across countries. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that competitiveness is a 
broad concept encompassing both developments in price and cost competitiveness and 
drivers of productivity, together with other considerations relating to exchange rates 
2015
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and certain factors affecting the ability to sell a product. In contrast with the Independent 
Fiscal Institutions which have an explicit mandate and act with binding numerical references 
that are coordinated at national and supra-national level,9 NPBs do not have this reference 
framework. Accordingly, specifying NPB objectives, subsequent assessment thereof and 
coordination at euro area level is difficult. 
Additionally, these boards will be required to conduct an independent analysis of economic 
policy challenges in the fields of productivity and competitiveness. In this case, the 
recommendation provides a certain degree of country discretion to define the final mandate 
for each NPB in each corresponding national transposition. Thus, each country will decide 
whether the competencies of the NPB include proposing economic policy alternatives and 
monitoring those approved or only analysing indicators. Restricting the role of NPBs to the 
latter tasks could limit the role of these institutions as catalysts and evaluators of the 
national reform agenda, although the existence of multiple interactions among structural 
policies makes it difficult to identify “best practices”.  
The recommendation allows for different types of institutional design, provided certain 
minimum requirements are met, guaranteeing functional independence, analytical rigour 
and transparency.10 These requirements aim to give credibility to these institutions. In this 
connection, the recommendation approved by the Council is highly flexible. Thus, NPBs 
can be newly created institutions, although it is recommended that they be set up based 
on existing institutions in order to harness accumulated knowledge and save in terms of 
administrative costs. In the latter case, the necessary measures should be taken to ensure 
their independence of national and European public authorities in designing and implementing 
competitiveness and productivity policies. Although the regulations establish that each 
Member State should set up only one NPB to fulfil the mandate, not all functions need to 
be directly addressed within the NPB; some can be developed in other institutions that 
would report directly to the boards, provided that their independence regarding 
performance and analytical rigour are guaranteed. NPBs should also be underpinned by a 
national legal provision, although its rank has not been specified. In addition, the legal 
status should contribute to reinforcing the independence of the new board, endowing it 
with greater stability and guarantees of continuity.  
Under European regulations, NPB heads should be appointed on the basis of candidates’ 
experience and competence. The resources available to them to fulfil their functions 
should be appropriate and they should have access to any information sources as may be 
required to fulfil the mandate. Analyses and recommendations should be disclosed 
regularly; specifically, it is suggested that an annual report be published or that analyses 
be included in an already existing report. 
Finally, the recommendation highlights the EC’s role in coordinating economic policy at 
European level, but grants the EC the freedom to take into account NPB conclusions in its 
recommendations within the framework of the European Semester. In this sense, since the 
concept of competitiveness is broad, it would be important for at least some of the 
techniques and indicators on which the NPBs base their analyses to be comparable across 
the different Member States in order to make a diagnosis at European level.  
 9  P. García Perea and E. Gordo (2016), “Los mecanismos de supervisión presupuestaria en la UEM”, Boletín 
Económico, March, Banco de España, and E. Gordo, P. Hernández de Cos y J. Pérez (2015), “Instituciones 
fiscales independientes en España y en la UEM”, Boletín Económico, February, Banco de España.
10  These basic principles are similar to those recommended by the OECD for the design of Independent Fiscal 
Institutions. 
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Certain euro area countries already have at least one body that performs the tasks assigned 
to NPBs by the European Council (see Table 2). Specifically, this set of tasks is performed 
in the Netherlands by the public body Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis (CPB), whereas in France several academic organisations, such as the CEPII, the 
French Economic Observatory (OFCE) or the French Council of Economic Analysis, coexist 
with other public agencies, such as France Stratégie under the authority of the Prime 
Minister, or private agencies, such as Coe‑Rexecode.
The functions currently carried out by the organisations in place include most notably the 
analysis of competitiveness, productivity and some of their drivers (see Chart 4). In certain 
cases, such as the Irish National Competitiveness Council, the main goal consists precisely 
of making a proper diagnosis of competitiveness in Ireland and recommending economic 
policy measures. In view of the multidimensionality of competitiveness, different indicators, 
such as developments in prices, costs, innovation, education or infrastructure, are monitored. 
Notably, a large number of institutions focus their analyses on wage performance. Such 
monitoring is not only of interest for national analyses of competitiveness, but it may also 
be used on occasion by collective bargaining committees, as occurs in Belgium with the 
Central Economic Council or in France with the Expert Group for the Collective Bargaining 
System and the Minimum Wage.11 Also, there is a fair number of organisations that advise 
governments on economic policy issues, such as the French Council of Economic Analysis, 
the German Council of Economic Experts or the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau. In 
general, these types of organisations are not currently much more involved than formerly 
in the ex‑ante assessment and ex‑post monitoring of government-implemented policies. 
One of the centres that does perform this task is the Dutch CPB, which participates in 
preparing economic reports on different laws.
With regard to institutional design, very few of these institutions are financially or organically 
independent of the public sector. Most receive all of their funding from the public sector 
and are organically linked to it and, in these cases, the chair of the institution, an expert of 
recognised standing, is elected by the government or parliament. In principle, in order to 
ensure independence, it would be advisable for NPBs to have a greater degree of autonomy 
Main characteristics 
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bodies responsible for 
analysing productivity 
and competitiveness 
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TABLE 2
11  In Belgium, for example, the CEC reports on the performance of competitiveness in Belgium relative to its three 
main trade partners (Germany, France and the Netherlands). The members of this body are appointed upon the 
recommendation of organisations representing workers and employers, and its reports are relevant input for 
collective bargaining. In France, the group of experts is comprised of researchers, professors and representatives 
of the administration who analyse and provide their viewpoint on the minimum wage. Its annual report is also 
used for collective bargaining purposes
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(as is the case with the German Council of Economic Experts). However, there are examples 
of highly reputed bodies for their policy analyses and recommendations that are organically 
dependent on the government, like the aforementioned Dutch CPB. In any event, in order 
to ensure the effective independence of these institutions, not only is the election of the 
chair or governing board members essential, but so are the duration of their mandates and 
the strict appraisal of the reasons why they may be removed from office.  
As regards internal structure, there are mainly two organisation models. Some advisory 
agencies are small in size and their functions are confined to monitoring certain indicators, 
with scant capacity to develop in-house analyses (such as the Expert Group for the 
Collective Bargaining System and the Minimum Wage in France), whereas the majority of 
organisations are composed of large agencies with a greater analytical capacity (such as 
the CPB or the Federal Planning Bureau in Belgium). The human capital level of qualification 
at the latter institutions is appropriate to perform the functions specified by the 
recommendation. Additionally, as mentioned previously, it is important for NPBs to have 
access to the information needed to perform their functions efficiently (this is the case of 
the CPB or the Federal Planning Bureau).
The recommendation on the establishment of NPBs adopted by the European Council on 
19 September, on a proposal from the European Commission, seeks to drive the reform 
agenda of the Member States and the EU as a whole in order to address the structural 
problems of low productivity growth and the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances in 
euro area countries. Adequate NPB design, appropriate and clear definition of NPB 
functions and guaranteed access to the resources needed to perform such functions 
could contribute to enriching the analysis and debate, at national and European level, of 
the structural reforms that are necessary to improve productivity and competitiveness. 
Insofar as the mandate of these institutions encompasses the assessment of alternative 
economic policies, their recommendations could become a catalyst for boosting a reform-
driven agenda.  
21.11.2016.
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